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NOTES
CHAPTER 13 DE MINIMIS PLANS:
TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON "GOOD FAITH"
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code)' continues the ap-

proach of prior law (Act)2 in allowing consumer debtors3 the option
of either liquidating their assets under Chapter

74

or paying their

creditors out of future income in accordance with court-approved
payment plans under Chapter 13. 5 However, in altering the me-

chanics of payment-plan relief, the drafters of the Code have
brought about a fundamental restructuring of debtor-creditor rela-

tions. It is far from clear from the bare language of the new law
just how far the debtor's obligation to repay his creditors now extends.

In contrast to the former Act, plan confirmation under the

Code is not founded upon creditor acceptance. 6 Instead the Chap-

1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified primarily in scattered sections of
11, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)) [hereinafter cited as 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330]. The
Code, which was signed into law on Nov. 6, 1978, applies to bankruptcy proceedings
commenced on or after Oct. 1, 1979.
2. See Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended
(codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1086 (1976)), repealed, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter cited by Act section
number; for example, Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 646
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1046 (1976)), repealed, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, would be cited here as Act § 646, 11
U.S.C. § 1046 (1976)].
3. To be eligible for relief under Chapter 13 of the Code, the debtor must qualify as an "individual with regular income," as that term is defined in § 101(24), 11
U.S.C. § 101(24), who falls within specified debt ceilings. See § 109(e), 11 U.S.C. §
109(e). Under the former Act, only an individual who was a "wage earner," as that
term is defined in Act § 606(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1006 (1976), was eligible for the paymentplan relief of Chapter XIII.
For the purpose of differentiating between the Act and the Code, it should be
noted that whereas the latter enumerates chapters with Arabic figures (e.g., Chapter
13), the former enumerated chapters with Roman figures (e.g., Chapter XIII).
4. See §§ 701-728, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-728.
5. See §§ 1301-1330, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
6. See § 1325, 11 U.S.C. § 1325. Under the former Act, a plan could not be confirmed unless it was accepted by a majority both in the number of unsecured creditors affected by the plan and in the amount of such unsecured claims. Furthermore, it
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ter 13 debtor need only satisfy the confirmation standards set forth
in section 1325 to receive judicial approval of his plan. 7 By
requiring the court to make an independent determination that the
criteria of section 1325 have been met, the Code in effect ordains
the bankruptcy judge the guardian of creditor interests. The theory
underlying Chapter 13 is that the statutory confirmation standards
alone provide sufficient protection of creditor interests, and there
is consequently no need to have creditors vote on a proposed
plan.8
Creditor disenfranchisement under the Code has given rise to
the recent phenomenon of the Chapter 13 "de minimis" plan, 9 and
has opened the floodgates to a new wave of cases centering on the
parameters of the "good faith" requirement of section 1325(a)(3).1 0
The debtors in such cases often argue that as long as unsecured
creditors receive at least as much as they would in a liquidation
case, 11 the plan satisfies the quantitative component of the Code's
confirmation requirements 12 and should therefore be confirmed as
had to be approved by all secured creditors whose claims were "dealt with by the
plan." Act § 652, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
8. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, 162 (1973), reprinted in App. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT].

9. A "de minimis" plan, as the term is used in this Note, is a plan of debt arrangement which proposes to pay unsecured creditors a nominal percentage of their

claims, if anything. It is imperative for one to recognize that under this usage of the
term it is possible for a plan to be de minimis even though substantial payments are
to be made to holders of priority or secured claims.
10. See In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480, 1 C.B.C.2d 780, 6 B.C.D. 219 (S.W.D. Va. 1980)
("good faith" is "matter of intention adequately consummated," which must be
measured on "sliding scale"); In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337, 1 C.B.C.2d 609, 5 B.C.D.
1285 (S.D. Cal. 1980) ("meaningful" payments required); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256,
1 C.B.C.2d 331, 5 B.C.D. 1270 (D. Utah 1980) ("meaningful" or "substantial" payments, but less than "best effort" required). Compare In re Burrell, 2 B.R. 650, 1
C.B.C.2d 474, 5 B.C.D. 1321 (N.D. Cal.) ("good faith" requires at least 70% repayment to unsecured creditors), rev'd, 6 B.R. 360, 2 C.B.C.2d 1019, 6 B.C.D. 900 (Dist.
Ct. N.D. Cal. 1980) with In re Terry, 3 B.R. 63, 1 C.B.C.2d 525, 5 B.C.D. 1397 (W.D.
Ark.) (no payment to unsecured creditors required), rev'd, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.
1980).
11.
A straight liquidation case is governed by Chapter 7 of the Code. See §
701-728, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-728.
12. Section 1325(a)(4) of the Code provides that the court shall confirm the plan
if inter alia
the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than
the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date.
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long as the other elements of section 1325 are met. 13 Creditors, on
the other hand, invariably claim that Congress intended the goodfaith element of section 1325(a)(3) to serve as the measuring stick of
repayment adequacy. 14 They argue that nominal payment plans are

inherently violative of the good-faith requirement since the quid
pro quo for the liberal rehabilitative provisions of Chapter 1315 is

the implicit obligation to make meaningful repayment of outstand-

ing unsecured debts. 16
From a study of the early cases arising under the Code, it is
clear that the courts are wholly inconsistent in their application of
the good-faith requirement of section 1325.17 At one extreme, a

plan proposing no payment to any creditors has been confirmed.' 8

At the other extreme, at least two courts have held that a mini-

mum of seventy percent repayment is always required for a plan
to be confirmed. 19 Such divergence of opinion illustrates the dan-

ger of leaving undefined the umbrella concept of good faith-what
is otherwise healthy judicial discretion gives rise to unequal protec11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (emphasis added). This provision is the equivalent of the
"best interests of the creditors" test found in § 656 of the former Act, 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(2) (1976). The best-interests-of-the-creditors standard is a term of art which is
not to be read literally. It connotes nothing more than a requirement that unsecured
creditors receive their liquidation equivalent. See In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 553, 2
C.B.C.2d 190, 193-94, 6 B.C.D. 412, 413-14 (W.D. Mich. 1980). This Note will use
interchangeably the phrases "best interests of the creditors" and "liquidation value"
as shorthand for the § 1325(a)(4) requirement.
Since secured creditors' entitlements are delineated in § 1325(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5), their claims are only tangentially related to the quantitative good-faith issue. For a discussion of how payments to secured creditors can have a bearing on
good faith in dealing with unsecured creditors' claims, see text accompanying notes
163-176 infra.
13. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
14. In other words, it is contended that good faith requires examination of the
sufficiency of the proposed payments and is not limited to the honesty of the
debtor's motives. See, e.g., cases cited in note 16 infra and accompanying text.
15. See text accompanying notes 46-71 infra.
16. Numerous courts have so held. E.g., In re Burrell, 6 B.R. 360, 2 C.B.C.2d
1019, 6 B.C.D. 900 (Dist. Ct., N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305, 1 C.B.C.2d
705, 6 B.C.D. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75, 1 C.B.C.2d 633, 5 B.C.D.
1375 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Campbell, 3 B.R. 57, 1 C.B.C.2d 653, 5 B.C.D. 1365
(S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 1 C.B.C.2d 331, 5 B.C.D. 1270 (D. Utah
1980).
17. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
18. See In re Terry, 3 B.R. 63, 1 C.B.C.2d 525, 5 B.C.D. 1397 (W.D. Ark.),
rev'd, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980).
19. See In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624, 6 B.C.D. 453 (M.D. Ga. 1980); In re Burrell, 2
B.R. 650, 1 C.B.C.2d 474, 5 B.C.D. 1321 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd, 6 B.R. 360, 2 C.B.C.2d
1019, 6 B.C.D. 900 (Dist. Ct., N.D. Cal. 1980).
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tion of the laws when the courts proceed upon different first principles.20

In order to achieve some semblance of uniformity in commercial relations, the Constitution vests exclusive responsibility for the
enactment of bankruptcy laws in the federal government. 2 ' The existing disparate application of Chapter 13 confirmation standards
frustrates that objective. Since most consumer liquidation cases
would result in no distribution to unsecured creditors, 22 it is particularly important to determine whether the good-faith requirement imports a quantitative element of its own into section 1325.23
In an attempt to abate some of the existing confusion, this Note
will examine the underlying policies and objectives of Chapter 13
in order to put the role of the good-faith concept into its proper
perspective. The thesis of this Note is that good faith is a quantitative standard which obligates the debtor to repay his unsecured
creditors in accordance with his means. If the debtor has little or
no surplus after taking account of his living costs and rehabilitative
needs, a de minimis plan may well be appropriate. In order to distinguish between the uses and abuses of Chapter 13, it is necessary
at the outset to give a general overview of the history and mechanics of the Chapter.
HISTORY AND POLICY OF CHAPTER

13

There are two overriding objectives of the American bankruptcy system. 24 The first is to "relieve the honest debtor from the
20. It is one thing to permit the facts of the given case to dictate what percentage repayment is fair; it is something quite different for the courts to be applying inconsistent legal requirements. The legislative history of the Code nowhere discusses
the good-faith standard and therefore offers little guidance.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 65; Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1975)
(statement of Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, then-Referee in Bankruptcy), reprinted in 10
BANKRUPTcY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LECISLATIVE HISTORY, Doc. No. 35 (A.
Resnick & E. Wypyski eds. 1979).
23. If liquidation value stood alone as the sole quantitative standard, arrangements known as "zero plans," i.e., no payment to unsecured creditors, would
abound. It is not difficult to see that such an interpretation would render Chapter 7
moot insofar as most consumer debtors are concerned: why would a debtor ever file
in Chapter 7 if he could reap the more generous benefits attendant to Chapter 13
without incurring greater obligation? In fact, it has been suggested that attorneys in
jurisdictions adhering to the view that liquidation value is the only quantitative
standard of confirmation would be guilty of malpractice per se for filing a Chapter 7
petition on behalf of a consumer debtor who would qualify for Chapter 13 relief. See
In re Hurd, 4 B.R. at 557-58, 2 C.B.C.2d at 199, 6 B.C.D. at 416.
24. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 71. A third principal objective
identified by the Commission Report is "economical administration." See id. at 75.
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weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes." 2 5 The second is to assure orderly and equitable administration of the debtor's estate so that the rights of creditors are fairly protected.26
While liquidation of the debtor's assets is remedial insofar as it
gives the debtor a discharge of many of his debts, 2 7 it is no
panacea for the debtor's financial problems, because it removes the
assets which would otherwise serve as his economic building
blocks.2 8 In order to afford the individual debtor more complete
relief, the former Act permitted qualifying "wage earners". 9 to opt
instead for Chapter XIII status. 30 Under this Chapter, the debtor
was permitted to retain his assets if he proposed and gained creditor acceptance of a plan to make debt repayment out of his future
earnings. 31 Since confirmation in Chapter XIII required the plan to
be in the "best interests of the creditors," 32 the creditors were assured of receiving at least as much as they would in liquidation.
Thus, in theory Chapter XIII relief was preferable to liquidation
from the standpoints of both the debtor and creditor.
Shortcomings of ChapterXIII
For various reasons, Chapter XIII did not achieve its intended
results. First, since secured creditors individually and unsecured
25.

Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55

(1915).
26.
27.

See COMMfSSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 76-79.
Liquidation under Chapter 7 gives the individual debtor who is not pre-

vented by the objections to discharge set forth in § 727(a), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), a discharge from all debts which arose prior to the date of the order for relief, save those
which are nondischargeable under § 523(a), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
28. Liquidation causes all of the debtor's assets except those which are specifically exempted under § 522(d), 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), to be removed from his control
and applied in repayment of the outstanding allowed claims.
29. A "wage earner" under the former Act was "an individual whose principal
income is derived from wages, salary, or commissions." Act § 606(8), 11 U.S.C. §
1006(8) (1976). To qualify for relief under Chapter XIII, the wage earner had to be
"insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature." Act § 623, 11 U.S.C. § 1023
(1976).
30. Under the former Chapter XIII, the debtor was required to attempt to effectuate a plan providing for payments solely out of his future earnings. Act § 623, 11
U.S.C. § 1023 (1976).
31. See id.; note 6 supra. In addition, the debtor had to meet the confirmation
standards of Act § 656, 11 U.S.C. § 1056 (1976). As a practical matter, however, creditor approval was the real key to confirmation.
The mandatory and optional provisions of a Chapter XIII plan are set forth in
Act § 646, 11 U.S.C. § 1046 (1976).
32. Act § 656(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(2) (1976); see note 12 supra.
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creditors collectively, possessed a veto power over the debtor's
plan, 33 they were often in a position to force a full payment extension plan rather than accept a composition. 34 This discouraged
many debtors from filing under Chapter XIII. Of those debtors
who did fie under the Chapter, many, in agreeing to undertake
full repayment within three years, 35 exceeded their capabilities. 36
As a result, wage-earner plans under the former Act had a high
37
mortality rate.
A second reason for the limited use of the composition feature
was the fact that the six-year bar to subsequent debt relief imposed
by the Act applied to Chapter XIII composition plans. 38 Many
debtors simply did not want to "waste" the opportunity for future
relief. 39
Third, if some unforeseen inability to make the required payments arose, the debtor would be ineligible for a "hardship" discharge40 unless the debtor had already complied with the terms of
the plan for three years 4 ' and the court determined that he should
not be justly held accountable for his inability to complete the
plan. 42 Thus, rather than undertake substantial payment obligations
and risk the loss of discharge in the process, many debtors opted
instead for liquidation.
Fourth, many debtors in need of relief did not meet the narrow eligibility requirement of being "an individual whose principal
income is derived from wages, salary, or commissions." 4 3 Excluded
33. See note 6 supra; cf. text accompanying notes 58-59 infra (creditors have no
veto power under Code).
34.

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 161. An extension plan is an ar-

rangement under which the debtor proposes to pay his debts in full over an extended period of time. A composition plan is an arrangement under which the debtor

proposes to pay his creditors a certain percentage on his debts, for which the debtor
will receive a full discharge.
35. While the Act did not place a three-year time limit on wage-earner plans,
three years became the normative duration because of the § 661 "hardship" discharge requirement that payments be made for at least three years. See id. at 160.
36. See id. at 12, 160.
37. Id.

38. Act § 14(c)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1976); see Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383
U.S. 392, 403 (1966); cf. text accompanying note 60 infra (Code does not provide for
time bar on subsequent Chapter 13 relief).
39. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 160-61.
40. A "hardship" discharge is the release from obligation afforded a qualifying

debtor who is unable to complete his plan.
41.

Cf. text accompanying notes 67-68 infra (no time restrictions for "hardship"

discharge under Code).
42.
43.

Act § 661, 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976).
Act § 606(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976); cf. text accompanying notes 55-56
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by Chapter XIII were individuals whose principal income was derived from welfare or retirement benefits and individuals who were
44
self-employed.
Finally, Chapter XIII relief was inflexible in that payments under the plan had to derive exclusively from future income. 45 In
other words, the debtor was prohibited from using his assets to effect payments under the plan. By so constraining the debtor, the
Act made it difficult for him to propose a plan that would be agreeable to his creditors.
The failings of the former Chapter XIII demonstrated the need
for more meaningful relief for individual debtors. 46 In drafting the
Code, the framers structured the new Chapter 13 with an eye toward expanded eligibility, 47 increased flexibility, 4 and more liberal
discharge of indebtedness. 49 But while the means were altered, the
ends of "fair treatment of all creditors and the rehabilitation of the
50
debtor" remain unchanged.
THE NEW APPROACH

Proceeding upon the belief that repayment plans are generally
more beneficial to all parties concerned than straight liquidation, 51
the drafters of the Code attempted to encourage greater use of
plan-type relief.52 First, Congress expanded eligibility under
Chapter 13 to include not only wage earners, but any "individual
with regular income" 5 3 who falls within specified debt ceilings.54 In
infra (Code expanded eligibility). This problem was to some extent mitigated by the
liberal construction placed on the eligibility requirements by the courts. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118-19 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963,
6079-80; cf. text accompanying notes 55-56 infra (Code expanded eligibility).
45. See Act § 623, 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1976); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8,
at 163-64.
46. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 12-14, 79-80.
47. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
48. See text accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
49. See text accompanying notes 57, 61-62 infra. For a discussion of the fundamental changes effectuated by the Code in the area of discharge of indebtedness, see
In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467, 469-70, 1 C.B.C.2d 1098, 1100-01, 6 B.C.D. 141, 142-43
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
50. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 75.
51.

See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE

5963, 6079.
See id.
§ 109(e), 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). For the Code's definition of "individual with
income," see text accompanying note 76 infra.
Section 109(e) of the Code provides that

CONG. & AD. NEWS

52.
53.
regular
54.
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shifting the focus from the source and nature of the income to its
stability and regularity, 55 many individuals who had theretofore
been denied the use of payment-plan relief, such as pensioners,

welfare recipients, and individual proprietors, gained access. 56 Moreover, the Code affirmatively encourages individuals to use the

payment-plan mode of relief by allowing the Chapter 13 debtor to
avoid most of the exceptions to discharge that are applicable to a
straight liquidation case under Chapter 7.57
Second, by abandoning the requirement of creditor approval

of the debtor's plan, 58 the Code removed the de facto bar to
composition plans which existed under the former Act. 59 In a further effort to remove the deterrents to the use of composition

plans, the new law does not preclude subsequent Chapter 13 relief
for a debtor who has had such a plan confirmed. 60 With composition plans possible, debtors are obviously more amenable to Chapter 13 relief. At the same time, the mortality rate of Chapter 13

plans is likely to decline sharply since debtors will no longer be coerced into undertaking obligations in excess of their means.
[o~nly an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing
of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than
$100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000,
or an individual with regular income and such individual's spouse, except a
stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing of the
petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than
$100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000
may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
55. Compare Act § 606(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976) with § 101(24), 11 U.S.C.

§ 101(24).
56. See HousE REPORT, supra note 44, at 312, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6268-69; S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5787, 5810.
57. See text accompanying notes 104-106 infra. Compare § 1328(a), 11 U.S.C. §
1328(a) with§ 523(a), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
58. Compare § 1325, 11 U.S.C. § 1325 with Act § 652, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976).
59. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
60. See § 1328, 11 U.S.C. § 1328. While use of the composition feature does not
bar future relief in Chapter 13, it does bar discharge in Chapter 7 liquidation for the
ensuing six years, unless payments made by the debtor under his plan were not less
than "(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such case; or (B)(i) 70 percent of such claims; and (ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and
was the debtor's best effort." § 727(a)(9), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9). Thus, it is clear that
while Congress sought to promote the use of the composition feature in appropriate
Chapter 13 cases, it did not want to remove all incentives for high payment plans.
See text accompanying note 128 infra.
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Third, the Code eliminated the former Act's provision that a
court could not confirm the debtor's Chapter XIII plan unless it
was satisfied that "the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts
or failed to perform any of the duties which would be a bar to the
discharge of the bankrupt."6 1 The drafters reasoned that ineligibility for discharge in straight bankruptcy should have no bearing on
eligibility for discharge in Chapter 13 since confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan requires a finding that it is6 2proposed in good faith and
is in the best interests of the creditors.
Fourth, to prevent frustration of Chapter 13 relief by unwilling secured creditors, the debtor is now permitted to "cram down"
his secured debts under the provisions of section 1325(a)(5). 63 That is,
61. Act §656(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(3) (1976). The Act provided that:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has (1)
committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided under title
18, United States Code, section 152; or (2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified,
concealed, or failed to keep or preserve books of account or records, from
which his financial condition and business transactions might be ascertained, unless the Court deems such acts or failure to have been justified under all the circumstances of the case; or (3) while engaged in business as a
sole proprietor, partnership, or as an executive of a corporation, obtained for
such business money or property on credit or as an extension or renewal of
credit by making or publishing or causing to be made or published in any
manner whatsoever a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition or the financial condition of such partnership or corporation; or (4) at any time subsequent to the first day of the twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, transferred,
removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or
concealed any of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors; or (5) in a proceeding under this Act commenced within six years
prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy has been granted
a discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition
or a wage earner's plan by way of composition confirmed under this Act; or
(6) in- the course of a proceeding under this Act refused to obey any lawful
order of, or to answer any material question approved by, the court; or (7)
has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiency of assets
to meet his liabilities; or (8) has failed to pay the filing fees required to be
paid by this Act in full ....
Act § 14(c), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1976).
62. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 163. Since the rights of creditors
are safeguarded by the Chapter 13 confirmation standards, the drafters saw no reason
to deny even wrongdoers the benefits of payment-plan relief. Id.; see note 12 supra.
63. The Code provides that with respect to secured claims dealt with by the
plan, confirmation should be granted if
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing
such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distrib-
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if the secured creditor does not accept the plan, the debtor nevertheless has the option of either paying such creditor the value of
the collateral 64 and allowing her to retain her security interest or
65
surrendering the collateral to the creditor.
Fifth, the Code permits the debtor to use his nonexempt assets, as well as his future income, to make payments under his
plan. 66 Thus, the debtor is given a greater degree of flexibility in
allocating his resources in fulfillment of his obligations.
Finally, the Code does not make three years of compliance
with the terms of the plan a prerequisite for "hardship" discharge
as the former Act did. 67 Rather, the new law permits the disabled
debtor, upon meeting the requirements of section 1328(b), to bail
out of his plan and receive a discharge of his indebtedness at any
time after confirmation. 68 From the foregoing, it is clear that Congress has provided great inducement for debtors to attempt repayment of debts in lieu of liquidation. Chapter 13 affords the debtor
innumerable benefits, including: (1) retention of property; 69 (2)
more comprehensive discharge relief;70 (3) protection of credit
standing; and (4) avoidance of the stigma attached to an individual
71
adjudicated a bankrupt.
Consideration of how a given chapter of the Code affects a
debtor is, at most, one-half of the problem. While Chapter 13 is a
vehicle for debtor rehabilitation, it serves at the same time the
uted under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder.

§ 1325(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

64. A creditor under the Code is deemed to have a "secured" claim only to the
extent of the value of the property securing the debt. The remainder, if any, is
treated the same as any other unsecured claim. See § 506, 11 U.S.C. § 506.
65. See note 63 supra.
66. See § 1322(b)(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8).
67. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 125, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6086. Compare § 1328(b), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) with Act
661, 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).

§

69. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6079.
70. See text accompanying notes 98-109 infra.
71. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6079. The benefits numbered "(3)" and "(4)" in the text
theoretically evolve from the debtor's self-imposed commitment to repay his credittors. Whether lending institutions will in practice view Chapter 13 debtors in a more
favorable light than Chapter 7 debtors remains to be seen.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss2/11

10

Emrich: Chapter 13 De Minimis Plans: Toward a Consensus on "Good Faith"
DE MINIMIS PLANS AND GOOD FAITH

function of protecting the interests of creditors. 72 Which of these
competing internal goals of the bankruptcy system 73 will outweigh
the other in a given case must be determined by the facts of the
particular situation. In the final analysis, the bankruptcy system
sides with neither debtor nor creditor but strives to achieve funda74
mental fairness between them in light of their circumstances.
Mechanics of Chapter13
Subject to specified debt ceilings, any individual debtor with
"regular income" may file for relief under Chapter 13.75 The Code
defines "individual with regular income" as any "individual whose
income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual
to make payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title,
76
other than a stock broker or a commodity broker."
Once a petition is filed, an automatic stay comes into opera72. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 62-79.
73. The Commission Report categorizes the various goals of the bankruptcy
system as being either "external" or "internal." Id. at 68-83. The "external" goals are

those which relate to the interaction between the bankruptcy process and the "open
credit economy." Since private credit plays a major role in the economy of the country, the bankruptcy system must be attuned to the ramifications its policies may have
on those who are not the principals in the bankruptcy process. See id. at 68-74. As an
illustration, one need simply consider how in facilitating debtor rehabilitation the existing bankruptcy system guards against individuals becoming counter-productive to
the overall economy.
The "internal" goals of the bankruptcy system are those which relate specifically
to the bankruptcy process. Id. at 75. The two "internal" goals which are most central
to the purposes of this Note are: (1) debtor rehabilitation, id. at 79-81; and (2) equitable disposition of creditors' claims, id. at 76-79.
74. See generally id. at 75-83.
75. See note 54 supra. The debt ceilings imposed by § 109(e) are designed to
prevent the use of Chapter 13 by individuals owning sizable businesses. Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 303, 304 (1979). The liberal benefits

and relatively uncumbersome procedures of Chapter 13 are intended for consumer
debtors and those sole proprietors who are too small to be equipped to deal adequately with the more demanding requirements of the Chapter 11 business reorganization provisions. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 319-20, reprintedin [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6276-77.

76. § 101(24), 11 U.S.C. § 101(24). Stockbrokers and commodity brokers are categorically excluded from Chapter 13 relief because of the nature of their debts.
Debtors who are either stockbrokers or commodity brokers invariably owe money on
customer accounts. The Code, under §§ 741-766, 11 U.S.C. §§ 741-766, imposes
"special protective rules" in Chapter 7 liquidation to protect the interests of these
otherwise vulnerable customers. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 319, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6276. However, since the more streamlined procedures of Chapter 13 do not afford similar protection, the drafters precluded access to the Chapter by the brokers. See id.
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tion, 7 7 which gives the debtor "breathing space" from collection or

enforcement activities so that he may put his affairs in order and
draft a payment plan. 7 8 To prevent coercion of the debtor through

the application of pressure on his relatives and friends,
Chapter 13
79
also provides for a stay of action against co-debtors.
Section 1322(a) sets forth three mandatory provisions for any

Chapter 13 plan. 80 First, the plan must "provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future income

of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is
necessary for the execution of the plan." 8 1 Second, the plan must
"provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments of all

claims entitled to priority under section 507 of this title, unless the
holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such
claim." 82 Finally, if the plan classifies claims, it must "provide the

same treatment for each claim within a particular class." 8 3 In addition to these mandatory provisions, section 1322(b) lists the op84
tional provisons a plan may contain.

The debtor's resource pool, known as his "estate," is broader
in Chapter 13 than it is in Chapter 7, since it includes after-

acquired property and income. 85 Because the Chapter 13 estate is
an "open" estate, 8 6 its exact value cannot be ascertained at the fil-

77. § 362, 11 U.S.C. § 362.
78. The legislative history makes clear the importance of the automatic stay:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by
the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.
It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It
permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply
to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain
creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 340, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6296-97; SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 54-55, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5840-41.
79. See § 1301, 11 U.S.C. § 1301. For example, a lending institution is stayed
from proceeding against a wife who co-signed her husband's loan when the husband
files a Chapter 13 petition.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a).
81. § 1322(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1).
82. § 1322(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
83. § 1322(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b).
85. Compare § 1306(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) with § 541, 11 U.S.C. § 541.
86. The estate is "open" in the sense that after-acquired property and wages
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ing date, but must be estimated by projection. Section 522(d) sets
forth the property of the debtor that may be exempted from the
estate. 87 The debtor has the option of electing either these federal
88
exemptions or the applicable state exemptions.
In order to avoid creating a system of institutionalized "wage
slavery," 89 Chapter 13 imposes a normal maximum of three years'
duration on plan payments. 90 Plans of much longer duration would
run the risk of putting the debtor on a financial treadmill and, in
most cases, would frustrate the goal of debtor rehabilitation. 91
Thus, in order to afford the debtor the opportunity to achieve renewed economic viability, the Code limits the period of time for
which the debtor must work for the benefit of his creditors.
A proposed plan does not become effective unless and until it
is confirmed by the court. 92 If the court is satisfied that the statuare to be included, but it is in effect limited by the three-year limit on plan
operability. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The exemptions enable the debtor to insulate specified
amounts of various types of property thought to be vital to the debtor's subsistence.
As deserving as creditors are of collecting on their outstanding claims, the bankruptcy system is not so insensitive to the needs of the debtor as to leave him without
the basic means of survival.
88. § 522(b), 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
89. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 117, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6078.
90. See § 1322(c), 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c). However, where exigent circumstances
exist, the court may approve a payment schedule of up to five years. See id.
91. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 117, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6078. Payment plans substantially in excess of three years'
duration would hinder the "fresh start" policy of the Code. If the debtor is to be a
contributing consumer in the "open credit economy," see note 73 supra, he must be
able at some point to work for his own benefit. The Code draws the line of compromise at three years.
92. The standards of confirmation are set forth in § 1325(a):
The court shall confirm a plan if(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other
applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or
by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not
less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the
debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
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tory criteria of section 1325 have been met, it must approve the

tendered plan. 93 The confirmation requirements most central to
the present discussion are: (1) the plan must have been "proposed

in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law;" 94 (2)
unsecured creditors must receive not less than they would if the
debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7;95 and (3) it must
appear that the debtor will be able to fulfill the terms of his plan.9 6
Once the plan is confirmed, the debtor and each creditor are
bound by its terms regardless of whether the plan provides for the
claim of the creditor and whether the creditor has objected to the
plan.9 7 If the debtor successfully completes all payments required
under his plan, he is entitled, with certain limited exceptions, 98 to
a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or otherwise disallowed.9 9 The broad scope of discharge is one of the most attractive
features of Chapter 13 relief. In a Chapter 7 liquidation case, dis-

charge may be denied in toto where the debtor is guilty of certain
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien
securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such
holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
93. Id. In light of the accommodating nature of the language employed in the §
1325(a) confirmation criteria, it is clear that while the Code directs the court to confirm a plan satisfying those criteria, the court has extremely broad discretion in
determining whether the elements have in fact been met.
94. § 1325(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
95.

§1325(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).

96. 9,1325(a)(6), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6). This is, in effect, the equivalent of the
"feasibility" requirement found under the former Act. See § 656(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. §
1056 (1976). The legislative history of § 1325(a)(6) states that
[the court will necessarily be required to consider the debtor's ability to
meet his primary obligation to support his dependents, because otherwise
the plan is unlikely to succeed. Moreover, it may force the debtor or his dependents to become a public charge, to the detriment of the debtor, his dependents, his creditors, and the public. If the debtor is able to meet his obligations, both under the plan and to his dependents, the court confirms the
plan.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 124, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6085.
97. § 1327, 11 U.S.C. § 1327. The plan may, however, be modified under § 1329,
11 U.S.C. § 1329.
98. See § 1328(a)(1)-(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1)-(2).
99. § 1328(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
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wrongfd conduct100 or where the debtor received a prior discharge
within the six-year period preceding the filing of his petition. 10 ' In
Chapter 13, on the other hand, discharge is not subject to objection on grounds that the debtor has been dishonest 02 or that he is
a habitual applicant for relief.' 03 Moreover, many of the exceptions
to discharge that are applicable in a liquidation case are made inapplicable in Chapter 13.104 The only types of debts which are
nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 completed-plan case are alimony
and support payments 0 5 and certain long-term obligations.' 0 6
If a debtor is unable to complete payments in accordance with
his plan, he may apply for permission to modify his plan pursuant
to section 1329.107 If the court deems a modification impracticable,
the debtor may nevertheless be granted a "hardship" discharge
08 It must
under section 1328(b) if the criteria therein are satisfied.'
100.

See § 727(a)(2)-(7), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(7).

101. See § 727(a)(8)-(9), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)-(9); note 60 supra.
102. Proceeding upon the assumption that it is generally better for all parties
concerned for the debtor to effect a payment plan than it is for him to liquidate his
assets, the Code allows the wrongdoer to gain the benefits of Chapter 13. See note
62 supra. This is not to be confused, however, with wrongdoing which relates to the
bankruptcy proceedings themselves. A debtor who acts dishonestly at any stage of
the bankruptcy proceedings is liable to either lose his quest for confirmation on the
ground of lack of good faith, see § 1325(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), or have his discharge revoked on the ground that it was obtained through fraud. See § 1328(e), 11
U.S.C. § 1328 (e). See also In re Bloom, 3 B.R. at 469-70, 1 C.B.C.2d at 1101, 6
B.C.D. at 143.
103. A debtor who fulfills the eligibility and confirmation criteria is not limited
as to the number of successive discharges he may receive in Chapter 13. See In re
Bloom, 3 B.R. at 469-70, 1 C.B.C.2d at 1101, 6 B.C.D. at 143.
104. Compare § 1328(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) with § 523(a), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
105. § 1328(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2).
106. § 1328(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1). The long-term obligations which are
excepted from dischargeability are those "on which the last payment is due after the
date on which the final payment under the plan is due." § 1322(b)(5), 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(5). A prime example is the home mortgage. A debtor who has a mortgage
debt which survives the term of his plan will not be able to obtain a discharge of
that indebtedness. Were it otherwise, it is not difficult to see that the great risk that
would be forced upon lenders would cause a substantial contraction in the credit
market.
It should be noted that while claims that have priority under § 507, with the exception of certain taxes, are technically dischargeable, they are not subject to composition in a completed plan case unless the holder of such claim so agrees, since all
priority claims must be paid in full under a Chapter 13 plan. § 1322(a), 11 U.S.C. §
1322(a).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
108. Section 1328(b) provides:
At any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and a hearing,
the court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not completed payments
under the plan only if-
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be noted, however, that a "hardship" discharge is less comprehensive than a regular discharge, because all of the nondischargeable
debts listed in section 523(a) apply in a hardship situation.109 Thus,
it is in the debtor's interest to make certain that he will be able to
fulfill the terms of the plan he proposes.
THE DE MINIMIS PLAN CONTROVERSY

It is clear that there are many benefits to be gained by filing a
Chapter 13 petition. Not only does the debtor who successfully
completes his plan get broader discharge than would be obtainable
in Chapter 7,110 but he is able to remain in possession of his property.'
Since the vast majority of consumer cases are "no asset"
cases," 2 creditors often receive little, if anything, in liquidation.
Thus, the debtor can normally meet the best-interests-of-the-creditors test of section 1325(a)(4)11 3 by proposing a plan offering
unsecured creditors either nominal amounts or nothing at all.
There is some disagreement among the courts as to whether a
Chapter 13 plan which has as its goal the discharge of a debt nondischargeable in Chapter 7 can ever be deemed to satisfy the section 1325(a)(4) test. It has been held that a creditor whose otherwise nondischargeable debt is dischargeable in Chapter 13 is not
receiving his liquidation equivalent, since he is losing his right to
pursue the debtor for the balance of his claim. n 4 However, the
vast majority of courts which have considered the matter have held
that since section 1325(a)(4) speaks solely in terms of what would
be "paid" on such claim in liquidation, the best-interests-of-the(1) the debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable;
(2) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property actually
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
not less than the amount that would have been paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor had been liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such
date; and
(3) modification of the plan under section 1329 of this title is not practicable.

11 U.S.C.
109.
110.
111.
CONG.

§ 1328(b).
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
Compare § 1328(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) with § 523(a), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6079.

112. See authorities cited note 22 supra and accompanying text.
113. See note 12 supra.
114. See In re Chaffin, 4 B.R. 324, 327, 2 C.B.C.2d 229, 232-33, 6 B.C.D. 426,
427-28 (D. Kan. 1980); In re McMinn, 4 B.R. 151, 153, 1 C.B.C.2d 1007, 1010-11, 6
B.C.D. 297, 298-99 (D. Kan. 1980).
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creditors test requires only that the creditors receive the equivalent of the amount that would actually be distributed in liquida5
tion. n
Many courts have refused to confirm de minimis plans on the
ground that the debtor is attempting to gain the advantages of
Chapter 13 relief without undertaking the commensurate burden of
providing for "meaningful" payments to the holders of unsecured
claims. 116 These courts view a de minimis plan as a subterfuge that
masks what is in effect a liquidation case." 7 The standards of confirmation set forth in section 1325 do not contain an express requirement that "meaningful" payments be proposed; the section
only states that payments to unsecured creditors must not be less
than they would receive in liquidation.1 8 Thus, the crux of the de
mimimis plan controversy is whether the good-faith requirement of
section 1325(a)(3) imports a quantitative standard of its own into
the confirmation scheme. If it does, one must then determine how
much repayment must be proposed to satisfy good faith.
The Parametersof Good Faith
Many of the courts that have confirmed zero or de minimis
plans have done so on the ground that the sole quantitative criterion for confirmation is the best-interests-of-the-creditors test. 1 9
Conversely, many of the courts that have denied confirmation of
115. See, e.g., In re Hurd, 4 B.R. at 553, 2 C.B.C.2d at 193-94, 6 B.C.D. at
413-14, In re Jenkins, 4 B.R. 278, 280, 2 C.B.C.2d 129, 131-32, 6 B.C.D. 378, 379 (D.
Colo. 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346, 349-50, 1 C.B.C.2d 795, 800-01, 6 B.C.D. 216,
218-19 (S.D.W. Va. 1980).
116. See, e.g., In re Hall, 4 B.R. 341, 2 C.B.C.2d 310, 6 B.C.D. 476 (E.D. Va.
1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305, 1 C.B.C.2d 705, 6 B.C.D. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re
Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 1 C.B.C.2d 331, 5 B.C.D. 1270 (D. Utah 1980); cf. In re
Anderson, 3 B.R. 160, 2 C.B.C.2d 594, 6 B.C.D. 73 (S.D. Cal. 1980) (low payment
plans confirmable in appropriate circumstances). But see text accompanying notes
184-194 infra. In speaking of "meaningful" payments, it is essential to distinguish
between total payments under the plan and payments to be made specifically to
holders of unsecured claims.
117. See, e.g., In re Bloom, 3 B.R. at 471-72, 1 C.B.C.2d at 1103-04, 6 B.C.D. at
144; In re Marlow, 3 B.R. at 308, 1 C.B.C.2d at 708, 6 B.C.D. at 79; In re Beaver, 2
B.R. at 340, 1 C.B.C.2d at 614-15, 5 B.C.D. at 1287.
118. § 1325(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
119. E.g., In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373, 6 B.C.D. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re
Harland, 3 B.R. 597, 1 C.B.C.2d 973, 6 B.C.D. 235 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Cloutier, 3
B.R. 584, 1 C.B.C.2d 909, 6 B.C.D. 196 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537, 1
C.B.C.2d 940 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 1 C.B.C.2d 935 (E.D. Ark.
1980); In re Terry, 3 B.R. 63, 1 C.B.C.2d 525, 5 B.C.D. 1397 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd, 630
F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980).
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such plans have done so on the ground that "substantial" or "meaningful" payments were not being offered to the holders of
unsecured claims. 120 Both the former courts and the latter courts
have in diverse ways misjudged the dimensions of the good-faith
requirement. Properly construed, the good-faith concept obligates
the debtor to pay his unsecured creditors only so much in excess of
liquidation value as he can reasonably afford to pay after taking account of his rehabilitative needs.
In drafting Chapter 13, Congress recognized both the need of
the debtor for relief and the right of the creditor to receive her fair
share from the debtor.121 In liberalizing the rehabilitative provisions affecting individuals in order to make payment-plan relief
more inviting to debtors, Congress was not unmindful of the interests of creditors.1 2 2 The line drawn by the Code as an absolute
minimum of creditor entitlement is the liquidation value of the
debtor's nonexempt assets. 123 Congress has thus determined that
in any case, no matter what the particular circumstances, if the
creditor is not receiving the value that she would receive in a
straight liquidation proceeding, she is not being treated fairly.1 24 If
liquidation value were the sole criterion of fairness, debtors with
no nonexempt assets would be in a position to propose plans offering no payment whatsoever.125 However, the pervasive theme running through the legislative history of Chapter 13 is that payments
must be made out of future income.1 26 If a debtor were permitted
120. E.g., In re Hall, 4 B.R. 341, 2 C.B.C.2d 310, 6 B.C.D. 476 (E.D. Va. 1980);
In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305, 1 C.B.C.2d 705, 6 B.C.D. 77 (N.D. Ill.1980); In re
Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 1 C.B.C.2d 331, 5 B.C.D. 1270 (D. Utah 1980).
121. See 123 CONG. REC. H 11,704-05 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Drinnan); HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6079.
122. See 123 CONG. REC. H 11,704-05 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Drinnan); HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6079.
123. § 1325(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
124. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 123-24, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6084-85.
125. It has been suggested in dictum that such a plan is really no "plan" at all,
and therefore fails the requirement of § 1321 that the debtor must "file a plan." See
In re Cook, 3 B.R. at 482, 1 C.B.C.2d at 783, 6 B.C.D. at 220. Even if this reasoning
is technically correct in a "zero" plan context, its ramifications are insignificant. A
debtor who proposes payment of a few pennies may circumvent the tenuous distinction drawn. The more meaningful line of inquiry is not whether a "plan" has been
filed, but whether the plan tendered has been proposed in good faith.
126. See In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 262-65, 1 C.B.C.2d at 340-44, 5 B.C.D. at
1273-75; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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to propose a no-payment plan, the "regular income" requirement
for entry into Chapter 13 would lose its meaning. 127 Indeed, it is
difficult to see what logic there would be in denying a debtor with
no income the opportunity to circumvent his debts if a debtor with
regular income were free to do so.
The fact that a debtor with no assets must nevertheless propose payment under his plan demonstrates that liquidation value is
not the safe harbor that many debtors claim it is. It is manifest
from the Senate Report that liquidation value is not to be viewed
in all cases as tantamount to fair treatment:
As in current law, 100 percent payment plans will be encouraged by the limitation on availability of a subsequent discharge
in § 727(a)(8) [sic] . . .

It is also necessary to prevent chapter

13 plans from turning into mere offers of composition plans under which payments would equal only the non-exempt assets of
8
the debtor.12
Since Congress designed Chapter 13 with the expectation that
creditors' "losses will be significantly less than if their debtors opt
for straight bankruptcy," it is obvious that liquidation value was not
intended to serve as the sole quantitative standard for confirmation. 12 9 Moreover, the Commission Report suggests that the term
"good faith" was intended to encompass quantitative considerations: "The [Bankruptcy Reform] act should not require . . . appli-

cation of the nonexempt assets to the immediate payment of debts
... except insofar as such application may be deemed necessary...

by the court to meet the statutory standards of the 'best interests
of creditors' and 'goodfaith.' "130 Finally, in the recent House debates on the proposed amendments to the Code, Congressman
Hyde stated:
Some of you, though, may be aware of problems which have
veloped with regard to the court's [sic] interpretation of
debtor's "good faith" in proposing his repayment plan. Since
act became effective a year ago, there have been several

dethe
the
in-

NEWS 5963; SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8.
127. See § 109(e), 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
128. SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5799 (emphasis added).
129. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6079. See also note 23 supra.
130. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 164 (emphasis added).
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stances in which bankruptcy judges have given their approval to
plans which offered the bare minimum to creditors-that is, an

amount equal to what they would have received under straight
bankruptcy in chapter 7. That was clearly not our intent when

we considered the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.1 31

Evaluating the Sufficiency of Payments
Since it is established that payment in excess of liquidation
value is to be expected of the debtor in appropriate circumstances,
the next step is to determine just how much repayment should be
required. Following the lead of In re Iacovoni,' 32 numerous bankruptcy courts have held that the good-faith standard requires all
Chapter 13 debtors to undertake "meaningful" or "substantial" repayment to the holders of unsecured claims.' 33 The problem with
this interpretation is that its overly broad reading of the good-faith
standard is inconsistent with the rehabilitative spirit of Chapter
13.134 Moreover, in designating "meaningful" or "substantial" repayment to unsecured creditors as an absolute prerequisite for confirmation, Iacovoni and its progeny are in effect demeaning the
35
statutorily imposed best-interests-of-the-creditors test.1
The "regular income" requirement of Chapter 13 dictates that
the debtor must have income "sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan . .

.

."13 In

order to qualify for entry into the Chapter, the individual must anticipate income over and above reasonable living expenses. 137 On
the surface, therefore, it would appear that any debtor who
qualifies as having regular income ought to be able to make "significant" repayment to his unsecured creditors over the course of the
three ensuing years.' 3 8 However, there are situations in which the
131. 126 CONG. REc. H 9305 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980).
132. 2 B.R. 256, 1 C.B.C.2d 331, 5 B.C.D. 1270 (D. Utah 1980).
133. E.g., In re Johnson, 5 B.R. 40, 1 C.B.C.2d 994, 6 B.C.D. 277 (S.D. Ohio

1980); In re Montano, 4 B.R. 535, 2 C.B.C.2d 431, 6 B.C.D. 487 (D. D.C. 1980); In re
White, 4 B.R. 349, 2 C.B.C.2d 224, 6 B.C.D. 459 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R.

467, 1 C.B.C.2d 1098, 6 B.C.D. 141 (C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305, 1
C.B.C.2d 705, 6 B.C.D. 77 (N.D. Ill.
1980).

134.

See text accompanying notes 163-168, 175-176 infra.

135.

See § 1325(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4); note 12 supra.

136. § 101(24), 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (emphasis added).
137. See HousE REPORT, supra note 44, at 124, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6085.
138. Good faith should normally be measured in terms of ability to pay over a
period of three years, since the Code draws the line of normal maximum plan duration at three years. § 1322(c), 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c).
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debtor has future income sufficient to make payments but may
need to use the money to pay a secured creditor 139 or the holders
of priority claims 140 in lieu of paying general unsecured creditors. 1 4 1 Although it is clear from the express language of Chapter 13

that the debtor must have a sufficiently regular and stable income
to make payments under a plan, 142 neither the Code nor its legislative history suggests that unsecured creditors must in every case be
the beneficiaries of those payments.14 By the terms of section
1325(a)(4), Congress has adopted liquidation value as the litmus44
paper test of per se quantitative bad faith. 1
The employment of a requirement of some unstated absolute
minimum payment to unsecured creditors is in clear violation not
only of the best-interests-of-the-creditors test, 145 but also of the
legislative direction that each case be decided upon its own
facts. 146 It seems unlikely that Congress, in extending eligibility for
Chapter 13 relief to welfare recipients,' 47 could have intended to
139.

The Code expressly permits the debtor to retain property used to secure a

debt by agreeing to pay the value of the property to the holder of the secured claim.
See § 1325(a)(5)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B); text accompanying note 174 infra.
140. See In re Thorson, 3 C.B.C.2d 66, 6 B.C.D. 1268 (D. S.D. 1980). The
debtor must always propose to pay the allowed priority claims in full. § 1322(a)(2),
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
141. See In re Thorson, 3 C.B.C.2d 66, 6 B.C.D. 1268 (D. S.D. 1980); In re Roy,
5 B.R. 611, 2 C.B.C.2d 985 (M.D. Ala. 1980). The debtor, in using his future income
to redeem collateral, clearly satisfies the requirement that payments be made to
creditors out of anticipated income.
142. See §§ 101(24), 109(e), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(24), 109(e).
143. The legislative history invariably refers to "creditors" without more specifically referring to "unsecured" creditors. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963; SENATE REPORT, supra note

56, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787. But see In re Iacovoni,
2 B.R. at 262-65, 1 C.B.C.2d at 339-44, 5 B.C.D. at 1273-75.
Although the House Report states that the Code "requires only that creditors receive under the plan more than they would if the debtor went into straight bankruptcy," HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 123-24, reprinted in [1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6084-85 (emphasis added), it clearly provides an inaccu-

rate description of the law as enacted. See In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. at 585, 1 C.B.C.2d at
910, 6 B.C.D. at 196-97. Section 1325(a)(4) only requires that the value of the property distributed under the plan be "not less than the amount that would be paid on
such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7." 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (emphasis added).
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
145. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
146. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5799; 123 CONG. REC. H 11,699 (1977) (remarks of Rep.

Edwards).
147. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 312, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6269.
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simultaneously inject into the Chapter a requirement that in every
case "meaningful" or "substantial" repayments be made to holders
of unsecured claims. 148 If Congress had desired to provide for a
fixed percentage minimum-payment requirement, it could have
easily done so. Bather, it chose to forego imposition of a stated
minimum in favor of the undefined and more fluid concept of good
faith. 149

The proper place for any preconceived minimum-payment requirement is at the Chapter 13 doorstep. If a debtor who lacks the
ability to make significant payment under a plan is to be denied
Chapter 13 relief, it must be because he does not qualify as a
debtor under the Chapter, and not because a de minimis plan demonstrates inherent bad faith.150 However, once he qualifies as a
debtor with income sufficiently regular and stable to be able to
propose a plan offering significant aggregate repayment 15 1-which
includes full payment of priority claims, 152 payment to secured
creditors to the extent of the value of the collateral, 153 and payments to unsecured creditors which are in no event below liquidation value 1 54 -the individual has demonstrated the requisite ability
to meet the abstract quantitative standards which apply in all
cases.155 At that juncture, the debtor's proposed payments must be
weighed solely in relation to his financial ability.15 6 That is, once
he steps inside the Chapter 13 door, the debtor is entitled to have
good faith measured in terms of what he can afford to pay in light
of his anticipated living expenses 157 and rehabilitation costs.158 The
148. Since welfare recipients normally have relatively low future income expectations, sums available for payment to unsecured creditors will not be "substantial" on an abstract scale.
149. See § 1325(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3); H.R. REP. No. 96-1195, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980), reprinted in BANKR. L. REP., Nov. 30, pt. 11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
150. See In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 262, 1 C.B.C.2d at 340-41, 5 B.C.D. at 1273;
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 25; 123 CONG. REC. H 11,699 (1977) (remarks of
Rep. Edwards).
151. The requirement of making significant total payments is a logical consequence of the "regular income" requirement. See text accompanying notes 125-127
supra.
152. See § 1322(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
153. See § 1325(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
154. See § 1325(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
155. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 123-24, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6084-85.
156. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 24-26.

157. See note 96 supra.
158. The overriding purpose of Chapter 13 is to "provide the debtor with a
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appropriate line of inquiry becomes not whether the payments to

unsecured creditors are in some sense "meaningful," but whether
the debtor has made a reasonable effort to pay in accordance with
his means. 15 9 Indeed, giving one's best effort negates, by definition, any allegation of quantitative bad faith.
When courts begin holding, as several have in effect already
done, 1 6° that good faith requires something greater than best effort, it is manifest that the term can no longer stand up under its
own weight. Since Congress has not yet seen fit to exact the best
effort of the debtor, 16 1 it follows a fortiori that it did not intend to
impose a payment standard in excess of the means of certain debtors who otherwise qualify for Chapter 13 relief. What constitutes
fresh start." See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963, 6078. The "fresh start" contemplated by Chapter 13
would appear to be broader than under Chapter 7, since it does not limit retention of
assets to property deemed exempt under § 522(d). In appropriate cases, the Chapter
13 debtor is permitted to invest in his own future by retaining property securing his
debt and paying off the secured creditor under his plan, to the detriment of the general unsecured creditors. See § 1325(a)(5)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). In enabling
the debtor to apply part of his nonexempt estate to redeem collateral with which to
further his rehabilitation, see text accompanying notes 163-176 infra, Chapter 13 assists the debtor in achieving renewed financial viability.
159. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 24-26; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
44, at 123-24, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6084-85; 123
CONG. REC. H 11,699 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
160. E.g., In re Murallo, 4 B.R. 666, 6 B.C.D. 478 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Hall, 4
B.R. 341, 2 C.B.C.2d 310, 6 B.C.D. 476 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337, 1
C.B.C.2d 609, 5 B.C.D. 1285 (S.D. Cal. 1980). The courts that have held the debtor's
best effort to be insufficient to satisfy the "meaningful" payment standard have in effect determined what is meaningful from the standpoint of the creditors rather than
from that of the debtor. However, even the Iacovoni court noted the importance of the
debtor's relative effort in determining whether the good-faith criterion has been met:
"The intent [of the legislature] seems clear that for confirmation to be granted, the
plan must propose a legitimate or substantial repayment of unsecured claims depending, of course, on the individual's particular situation." 2 B.R. at 267, 1 C.B.C.2d
at 347, 5 B.C.D. at 1277.
161. The courts are in agreement that the law as it now stands does not require
the debtor's "best effort." See, e.g., In re Burrell, 6 B.R. 360, 366, 2 C.B.C.2d 1019,
1026, 6 B.C.D. 900, 904 (Dist. Ct., N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Schongalla, 4 B.R. 360, 363,
2 C.B.C.2d 286, 289, 6 B.C.D. 408, 410 (D. Md. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 267,
1 C.B.C. 2d at 346-47, 5 B.C.D. at 1276. The Senate version of the so-called "Technical Amendments Bill" would amend current law to require the "best effort" of the
debtor. S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 188, 125 CONG. REc. S 12,185 (1979); see S.
REP. No. 96-305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]. However, the House has rejected the Senate version in favor of a "good
faith effort" test. See S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b), 126 CONG. REC. H 9,299
(daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 24-26. As of this
writing, there is an impasse between the two branches of the legislature on this
issue.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 11
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:593

good faith for one debtor may not constitute good faith for another
debtor, but it is clear in any event that financial ability is the cornerstone of a quantitative good-faith standard.162
The Redemption Motive
Where a debtor is obligated on a secured debt, the Code gives
him the option of either surrendering the collateral to the secured
creditor or redeeming the property securing the debt by paying
the value of the secured claim under the plan. 163 The situation may
arise in which the debtor seeks to save his house from foreclosure
and therefore desires to pay his secured creditor out of his future
income. Obviously, this would reduce the amount available for
payment to unsecured creditors. But can it be said that the debtor
who makes little or no payment to his unsecured creditors in order
to preserve his house acts in bad faith? 16 4
The good-faith requirement may in appropriate circumstances
compel the surrender of nonexempt assets in payment of one's
debts; 16 5 however, it must be borne in mind that the foremost distinction between a Chapter 7 liquidation case and a Chapter 13
case is the retention of assets. 166 The object of Chapter 13 is not to
extract the lifeblood from the debtor; it is to rehabilitate him.167 In
162. As stated by Congressman Don Edwards during the House debates, "if
the debtor makes an effort to repay his creditors, the creditors should not be able to
say that the plan does not propose to pay enough .... " 123 CONG. REC. H 11,699
(1977); see In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 267 n.4, 1 C.B.C.2d at 347 n.4, 5 B.C.D. at 1277
n.4; text accompanying notes 201-208 infra.
163. See note 139 supra; text accompanying note 174 infra.
164. Several courts have confirmed de minimis plans under which payments
went to creditors who held security interests in property that was essential to the
debtor's rehabilitation. E.g., In re Zellmer, 6 B.R. 497, 3 C.B.C.2d 42 (N.D. 111. 1980)
(truck used for livelihood); In re Johnson, 6 B.R. 34, 2 C.B.C.2d 552, 6 B.C.D. 579
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (house); In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611, 2 C.B.C.2d 985 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (vehicle used for transportation to work); In re Bellgraph, 4 B.R. 421, 2 C.B.C.2d 1057, 6
B.C.D. 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (house); In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 1 C.B.C.2d 935 (E.D.
Ark. 1980) (car). But see In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876, 3 C.B.C.2d 170, 6 B.C.D. 1272
(W.D. Ky. 1980) (denying confirmation of 1% plan where motive was to retain car).
165. See In re Patterson, 4 B.R. 239, 2 C.B.C.2d 149 (C.D. Cal. 1980); text accompanying note 130 supra.
166. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6079.

167. See note 158 supra; text accompanying notes 198-200 infra. The Commission Report, in rejecting a "liquidation plus" approach for the new Chapter 13,
states:
A requirement that all of the debtor's nonexempt property be applied immediately to the payment of his debts would subject the petitioner with regular
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order to facilitate his revitalization, the Code generally permits the
Chapter 13 debtor to retain his assets. 168 However, since the retention of assets is tied to the good-faith requirement, 169 it would
seemingly be proper for the court to scrutinize the underlying
motive for redemption of assets that are subject to a security interest in those cases in which the debtor's good faith is ques170
tioned.
While it may not constitute bad faith to pay a secured creditor
at the expense of unsecured creditors in order to save one's house
from foreclosure, it is doubtful that the same can be said of saving
a yacht or other such luxury item. 171 It would appear from recent
decisions that the debtor should be permitted to make the trade-off
where items tending to further the policy of rehabilitation are concerned 172 and the unsecured creditors are receiving at least the
value they would receive in liquidation, but he should be denied
this privilege where he seeks to use funds which would otherwise
go to his unsecured creditors in order to live in luxury.' 73 In the
income seeking relief... to the obligations and burdens imposed on a bankrupt under the liquidation chapter along with the obligation assumed to pay
debts out of future income.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 164.
168. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEwS 5963, 6079. In fact, the former Act did not even permit a Chapter XIII debtor to voluntarily distribute his assets to unsecured creditors under his
plan. See CONINiSSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 163-64.
169. See text accompanying notes 130, 165 supra.
170. See In re Zellmer, 6 B.R. at 500-01, 3 C.B.C.2d at 47. At least one court
has denied confirmation of a Chapter 13 de minimis plan based on the type of asset
sought to be retained. See In re Patterson, 4 B.R. 239, 2 C.B.C.2d 149 (C.D. Cal.
1980) (expensive sportscar).
171. Compare In re Zellmer, 6 B.R. 497, 3 C.B.C.2d 42 (N.D. Ill. 1980) and In
re Johnson, 6 B.R. 34, 2 C.B.C.2d 552, 6 B.C.D. 579 (N.D. Ill. 1980) and In re
Bellgraph,.4 B.R. 421, 2 C.B.C.2d 1057, 6 B.C.D. 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) with In re
Patterson, 4 B.R. 239, 2 C.B.C.2d 149 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Retention of vital assets is
consistent with the Code's policy that "the primary duty of the debtor [is] to provide
in the future for the reasonable support and maintenance of the debtor and any dependents." HousE REPORT, supra note 149, at 25.
172. A "rehabilitative asset," as that term is used in this Note, is one which assists the debtor in surviving his financial crisis or in generating future income. For
example, the revitalization policy of Chapter 13 would justify retaining the tools of
one's trade. See In re Zellmer, 6 B.R. 497, 3 C.B.C.2d 42 (N.D. Ill. 1980). While such
individual is paying off a creditor who holds security interests in rehabilitative property at the expense of his unsecured creditors, the unsecured creditors are at least
receiving the value that they would be entitled to in liquidation, which is what Congress has set as the statutory minimum of fairness.
173. Compare In re Zellmer, 6 B.R. 497, 3 C.B.C.2d 42 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (truck
used for livelihood) and In re Johnson, 6 B.R. 34, 2 C.B.C.2d 552, 6 B.C.D. 579
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formative stages of the Code, the Commission Report recommended that debtors be given the option of "cramming down" secured creditors in order to enable the debtors to retain assets
which serve important functions:
In recognition of the fact that exemptions alone will not insure
that the debtor will be able to retain the basic means of survival, the Commission recommends that a consumer debtor be
allowed to redeem collateral securing a dischargeable consumer
174
debt by paying the lesser of the claim or the appraised value.
In any given case, what needs to be defined is the point at which
the debtor would transcend the limited aim of rehabilitation and
begin to affirmatively profit from the enabling legislation.
Where a debtor's anticipated income is modest and he has few
nonexempt assets, all of which are of a substantially rehabilitative
nature, the quantitative good-faith requirement should approximate
the best-interest-of-the-creditors test. That is, where the debtor's
limited ability forces him to a choice between earmarking his available funds for payment to holders of claims secured by rehabilitative property or to holders of unsecured claims, the flexible
good-faith standard should bend in favor of debtor rehabilitation. 175 Where a debtor's intentions are laudable, and his proposed
payments satisfy the best-interests-of-the-creditors test and are substantially in proportion to his means, it cannot be said that the
176
creditors are being treated unfairly.
The De Minimis Plan Anomaly
A number of courts have denied confirmation of de minimis
plans on the ground that confirmation would result in the anomalous situation in which debtors who propose and carry out nominal
payment plans would be eligible for the generous Chapter 13-type
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (house) and In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611, 2 C.B.C.2d 985 (M.D. Ala. 1980)
(vehicle used for transportation to work) and In re Bellgraph, 4 B.R. 421, 2 C.B.C.2d
1057, 6 B.C.D. 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (house) and In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 1 C.B.C.2d
935 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (car) with In re Patterson, 4 B.R. 239, 2 C.B.C.2d 149 (C.D. Cal.
1980) (expensive sportscar). But see In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876, 3 C.B.C.2d 170, 6
B.C.D. 1272 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (denying confirmation of 1% plan where motive was to
retain car).
174. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 169 (emphasis added).
175. See In re Zellmer, 6 B.R. at 500-01, 3 C.B.C.2d at 47 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re
Roy, 5 B.R. at 613, 2 C.B.C.2d at 987.
176. See 123 CONG. REC. H 11,699 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); text accompanying note 115 supra.
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discharge, while debtors who attempt substantial payment and are
able to pay most but not all that the plan calls for are in effect relegated to the narrower "hardship" discharge. 177 Congress, it is reasoned, could not have intentionally created such a disparity in
treatment; therefore, the drafters must not have contemplated the
18
confirmation of de minimis plans. 7
The apparent anomaly of this situation is not, however, sufficient cause to categorically proscribe low payment plans. In the
first place, the scope of the anomaly should in practice prove to be
minimal. The debtor who is unable for some unforeseen reason to
meet the terms of his payment plan may apply for modification of
his plan pursuant to section 1329.179 By completing his plan as
modified, the debtor would be eligible for the broad discharge afforded the Chapter 13 debtor who completes his original plan.18 0
Thus, it is only where modification of the debtor's plan is impracticable that the anomaly survives.181
More importantly, the disparity in treatment can be explained
on grounds other than Congressional noncontemplation of de
minimis plans. It is the so-called "hardship" discharge 82 itself
which in the final analysis is the aberration which gives rise to the
existing anomaly. The ambivalent nature of the relief which flows
from the hardship discharge 8 3 is undoubtedly a reflection of the
need to deter plan-breaking. The drafters may well have feared
that by putting the hardship discharge on a par with ordinary discharge they would be giving debtors incentive to cease making
payments altogether. Thus, they offered less comprehensive discharge relief to debtors who terminate payments in midstream.

177. See In re Seman, 4 B.R. 568, 570, 2 C.B.C.2d 394, 396, 6 B.C.D. 626-27

(S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Campbell, 3 B.R. at 59, 1 C.B.C.2d at 655-56, 5 B.C.D. at 1366;
In re lacovoni, 2 B.R. at 262-63, 1 C.B.C.2d at 341, 5 B.C.D. at 1273.
178.

See In re Seman, 4 B.R. at 570, 2 C.B.C.2d at 396, 6 B.C.D. at 626-27; In

re Campbell, 3 B.R. at 59, 1 C.B.C.2d at 655-56, 5 B.C.D. at 1366; In re Iacovoni, 2
B.R. at 262-63, 1 C.B.C.2d at 341, 5 B.C.D. at 1273.

179. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
180. See § 1329(b)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2) (providing that plan as modified
becomes plan, if approved after notice and hearing).

181.
182.

See § 1328(b)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(3).
§ 1328(b), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).

183. The "hardship" discharge is ambivalent in that it affords a debtor who is
unable to meet the terms of his plan a discharge of many of his obligations, but de-

spite the debtor's financially troubled position, denies him a parity of discharge relief with those debtors who are able to complete their plans.
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The DischargeMotive
Many of the courts which have refused to confirm zero or de
minimis plans have based their refusal on the fact that the debtor
would be receiving the broad discharge of Chapter 13 without
incurring the reciprocal burdens contemplated by the Chapter. 184
Such reasoning is suspect on both practical and theoretical
grounds. First, not all Chapter 13 debtors are in a position to benefit from the broader Chapter 13 discharge. If the debtor has no
debts which would be excepted from dischargeability in Chapter 7
but which are dischargeable in Chapter 13, he will be obligated to
repay his creditors no less under Chapter 13 than under Chapter
7. Thus, the filing of a de minimis plan in Chapter 13 does not by
itself establish a motive of debt avoidance and cannot be said to
constitute bad faith per se. Moreover, if in every case confirmation
depended upon absolving the debtor of a debt-avoidance motive,
resolution of the dischargeability issue would have to precede confirmation. In some cases, therefore, full-scale dischargeability hearings would have to be held at the preliminary stages of the relief
proceedings. It is not difficult to see that this would substantially
85
interfere with judicial economy. '
Even if a debtor admits filing a Chapter 13 de minimis plan in
order to take advantage of the expanded discharge, 186 he may nevertheless be deserving of confirmation. True, the debtor may be
benefiting at the expense of his general unsecured creditors. However, he is only taking what the law gives him in exchange for
meeting the Chapter 13 asking price. The broad discharge of Chapter 13 is in effect earned by the debtor, not because he pays his
creditors X dollars more than they would receive in liquidation,
but rather because as a Chapter 13 debtor, he must put his future
financial ability on the table and attempt to effect a reasonable and
184. E.g., In re Murallo, 4 B.R. 666, 6 B.C.D. 478 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Hall, 4
B.R. 341, 2 C.B.C.2d 310, 6 B.C.D. 476 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Campbell, 3 B.R. 57, 1

C.B.C.2d 653, 5 B.C.D. 1365 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 1 C.B.C.2d
331, 5 B.C.D. 1270 (D. Utah 1980).

185. See In re Marlow, 3 B.R. at 307, 1 C.B.C.2d at 707, 6 B.C.D. at 78.
186.

Compare § 1328(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) with § 523, 11 U.S.C. § 523. Both

the House and Senate versions of the proposed Technical Amendments Bill would
substantially mitigate the existing disparity between Chapter 7 discharge and Chapter 13 discharge. See S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 191 (1979) [Senate], 125 CONG.

REc. 12,185 (1980); S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 130 (1980) [House], 126 CONG. REc.
9,299 (1980).
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complete mobilization of that ability. 8 7 The debtor's just deserts

ought not be rescinded simply because his financial ability is insufficient to offer "substantial" sums to his unsecured creditors after

taking account of priority and secured claims.1 8
In keeping with its commitment to facilitating debtor rehabilitation, the drafters demonstrated a strong preference for resort to

payment-plan relief in lieu of liquidation wherever possible.'8 9 In
light of this preference, Chapter 13 eligibility standards should be

liberally interpreted. Unlike the former Act,' 90 the Code nowhere
manifests exclusivity as to chapter eligibility. The law as written

does not require that the debtor be restricted to liquidation simply
because the end result of filing a de minimis plan in Chapter 13
would not be more favorable to general unsecured creditors. Nor

does the Code demonstrate an intent that good faith be measured
inversely against the benefits a particular debtor will derive from

Chapter 13.191 As long as the debtor satisfies the "regular income"
requirement'

92

and proposes to pay his creditors in accordance

with his ability, but in no event less to his unsecured creditors
than the value they would receive in liquidation, 1 9 3 he should be

free to avail himself of the relief offered by Chapter 13. 194
PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

As the situation now stands, many debtors are seeking relief in
Chapter 13 not so much for the legitimate purpose of good-faith rehabilitation, but rather for the less-than-honest use of the Chapter
as a haven from which to escape affordable outstanding debts.
187.

See In re Thorson, 3 C.B.C.2d at 70, 6 B.C.D. at 1269-70 (D. S.D. 1980);

supra note 149, at 25.
188. See In re Thorson, 3 C.B.C.2d at 70, 6 B.C.D. at 1269-70 (D. S.D. 1980);
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 25.
189. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 118, 121, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
HOUSE REPORT,

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6078, 6082.

190. See Act § 146, 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1976).
191. While it has been suggested that the Chapter 13 good-faith standard exacts
payment on a "sliding scale" based on how much broader the debtor's discharge is
in Chapter 13 than it would be in Chapter 7, see In re Cook, 3 B.R. 481, 1 C.B.C.2d
780, 6 B.C.D. 219 (S.D. W. Va. 1980), this view of good faith is nowhere supported by
the Code or its legislative history. See In re Thorson, 3 C.B.C.2d at 70, 6 B.C.D. at
1269-70.
192. § 109(e), 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
193. See § 1325(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
194. See In re Thorson, 3 C.B.C.2d at 70, 6 B.C.D. at 1269-70. See also HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 149, at 25.
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Such debtors are in clear violation of the purpose and spirit of
Chapter 13, and their plans should not be confirmed. It is readily
deduced from the regular-income requirement that total payments
under the plan must not be insignificant. 195 Exactly how much is
to be distributed and how that total is to be allocated must depend
96
upon the facts of the given case.'
The question of "how much is enough?" is not easily answered. At one extreme, the debtor, at the absolute minimum,
must propose to pay creditors the value they would receive in liquidation.' 9 7 At the other extreme, it is clear that the Code does
not presently contemplate a requirement of best effort.19 8 The
probable reason for this is the apprehension that if best effort were
required, enough resources would be drained from the debtor to
frustrate the underlying Chapter 13 goal of rehabilitation.' 99 Thus,
a best-effort requirement was intentionally omitted from the House
version of the so-called Technical Amendments Bill. 200 If enacted
in the form passed by the House, the new section 1325(a)(3) would
permit confirmation of a plan if "the plan has been proposed in
good faith and not by any means forbidden by law, and represents
the debtors good faith effort."201 The phrase "good faith effort"
leaves little doubt that something in excess of the absolute minimum (i.e., liquidation value) would be required where it is in the
debtor's power to offer more. 202 This would appear to put an end
195. See § 101(24), 11 U.S.C. § 101(24).
196. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 56, at 13, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5799.

197. See § 1325(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
198. See text accompanying note 161 supra. Section 727(a)(9)(B) attaches a prerequisite of "best effort" in past performance as a Chapter 13 debtor for the debtor
who received a discharge to be eligible for subsequent Chapter 7 discharge within a
six-year period. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)(B). However, the "best effort" criterion Is
noticeably absent from the language of the Chapter 13 discharge provisions. See §
1328, 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
199. See note 171 supra.
200. See S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b), 126 CONG. REC. H 9,299 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1980); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 24-26.
201. S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b), 126 CONG. REC. H 9,299 (daily ed.
Sept. 22, 1980) (new matter in italics).
202. The House Report accompanying the Bill states that
[t]he purpose of the "good-faith effort" test of subsection 1325(a)(3) is to prevent the use of chapter 13 composition plans by debtors having a demonstrated ability, but not the willingness, to make whatever payments their
particular circumstances reasonably permit over and above their primary obligations to support themselves and their dependents during the extension
period. Under these criteria, the circumstances of a given case may require
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to the line of cases using liquidation value as the sole quantitative
requirement for confirmation. 20 3 Furthermore, it is significant that
the good-faith-effort requirement focuses attention on the debtor's
ability to pay, rather than on how much money unsecured credit2 4
ors are entitled to receive. 0
One may argue that the distinction drawn in the House Report on the Technical Amendments Bill between the existing goodfaith test and the proposed supplementary good-faith-effort test
demonstrates that the law in its present form is unconcerned with
the degree of the debtor's effort in relation to his ability.20 5 Itis
submitted, however, that those courts which have viewed the
debtor's relative effort as an implicit component of the traditional
good-faith standard 20 6 have acted prudently in light of the purposes
and spirit of Chapter 13. It was the intention of Congress from the
outset to use the debtor's ability as the gauge with which to measure the adequacy of his proposed payments.207 Thus, while the
proposed good-faith-effort test would certainly provide the legislative guidance needed to create order out of the existing confusion,
it would merely clarify the law as it now stands rather than effect
substantive change.
CONCLUSION

When good faith is measured in terms of ability and effort, it
is clear that payment plans offering unsecured creditors nominal
amounts may in appropriate circumstances be confirmed. That de
minimis plans have their place in Chapter 13 is made explicit by
the House Report on the Technical Amendments Bill: "[T]he circumstances of a given case may require that the court confirm a
that the court confirm a chapter 13 plan which proposes no dividend whatever to holders of allowed unsecured claims or that the court deny confirmation of a plan proposing a 95% dividend to the holders of such claims.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 25-26.
203. See, e.g., In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373, 6 B.C.D. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re
Harland, 3 B.R. 597, 1 C.B.C.2d 973, 6 B.C.D. 235 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Cloutier, 3
B.R. 584, 1 C.B.C.2d 909, 6 B.C.D. 196 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537, 1
C.B.C.2d 940 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 1 C.B.C.2d 935 (E.D. Ark.

1980).
204.
205.
206.
481-82; In

See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 149, at 24-26.
Id.
E.g., In re Bellgraph, 4 B.R. at 423, 2 C.B.C.2d at 1059-60, 6 B.C.D. at
re Schongalla, 4 B.R. at 362-63, 2 C.B.C.2d at 288-89, 6 B.C.D. at 409-10; In

re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 267, 1 C.B.C.2d at 347, 5 B.C.D. at 1276-77.
207. See Statement of Congressman Edwards, supra note 162; text accompanying note 131 supra.
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chapter 13 plan which proposes no dividend whatever to holders
of allowed unsecured claims .
2...
208 The extent to which a debtor
must offer his creditors more than they would receive in liquidation must in the final analysis depend upon his ability to effect
such payment. In order to have his plan confirmed, the debtor
should be required to mobilize his resources effectively enough so
that it may be said that he dealt with his creditors in a manner
which was fundamentally fair in light of the rehabilitative purposes
of Chapter 13.
Edmund Michael Emrich
208. HousE REPORT, supra note 149, at 25 (emphasis added).
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